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I think we’re at a very interesting stage. The metaphor I use is that the first 
Muslims that came here were like the farmer standing on the ground; they 
were standing on it but didn’t have roots in it. But their seed has been scat- 
tered with some falling on good ground, others falling on stony ground and 
yet some being blown away in the wind. In some ways, we’re only now at the 
beginning of establishing a genuine Muslim presence in Britain, and Muslim 
schools are the key to that presence. 
—Idreas Mears, Association of Muslim Schools 
(AMS) (Interview, 1 April 2006) 
 
Introduction 
In the opening quotation, the director of the Association of Muslim (AMS), 
Idreas Mears, figuratively traces the emergence of Muslim schools in Britain, 
presently numbering over 100 in the independent sector and 20 with some kind 
of state funding. Whilst their number may indeed support Mears’s vision of a 
‘flowering’ British Muslim identity, their place within the British education sys- 
tem remains the subject of intense debate (Tinker, 2007; Parker-Jenkins, 1995; 
Parker-Jenkins et al., 2005; Fetzer and Soper, 2004). Frequently named in vari- 
ous deliberations concerning Muslim civic engagement, political incorporation 
and social integration (Shah, 2012, 2014), to some commentators Muslim schools 
represent little more than an irrational source of social division (Dawk- ins, 2007; 
Grayling, 2006; National Secular Society (NSS), 2006; Humanist Philosophers’ 
Group (HPG), 2001). Others, meanwhile, are more welcoming of Muslim schools 
in viewing their existence as an antidote to a prescriptive or coercive 
assimilation, and heralding their potential incorporation into the main- stream as 
an example of how ‘integration’ should be based upon reciprocity and mutual 
respect (Ameli, Azam and Merali, 2005; Association of Muslim Social Scientists 
(AMSS), 2004; Hussain, 2004; Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 
2004). These differing sides of the spectrum, it appears, are illus- trative of the 
way in which Muslim schools have emerged as a highly salient issue that at 
times reinforces, and at other times cuts across, political and philosophical 
divides. 
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It therefore comes as some surprise to learn that despite a general proliferation 
of literature on Muslims in Britain, a literature that has multiplied as one seeming 
crisis has given way to another, very little research has explicitly investigated how 
an increasingly salient articulation of Muslim identity connects with the issue of 
Muslim schooling. To be sure, and notwithstanding sustained Muslim mobilisa- 
tions for Muslim schools within and across diverse Muslim communities, sur- 
prisingly little is known of how these mobilisations are being undertaken, what is 
being sought, and, more generally, why Muslim schools are deemed to be an 
important issue for different Muslim communities. We address these questions 
through the use of primary interviews with Muslim educators and stake-holders, 
including teachers and Muslim educational associations, alongside other case 
study instruments including field notes and documentary and policy analysis. The 
chapter focuses on the contemporary nature of Muslim mobilisations that are 
investigated, specifically in order to answer the following questions. Firstly, why 
have there been sustained Muslim mobilisations on the issue of Muslim schools 
within and across diverse Muslim communities? Secondly, what does the engage- 
ment or non-engagement of Muslims over the issue of education reveal about their 
incorporation into a rubric of British citizenship? Thirdly, how can Muslim 
educators and advocates address their critics and broader concerns over the place 
of Muslim schools in Britain? 
 
The policy context 
In order to facilitate more advanced discussion later in the chapter, it is worth 
briefly setting out the public policy context with respect to Muslim schools here at 
the beginning, where a concise overview can be gained by turning our atten- tion 
to a recent watershed in Muslim schooling. This watershed was achieved in 1998 
when, after 18 years of a Conservative administration, a ‘New Labour’ 
government delivered on a promise in its election manifesto and co-opted two 
Muslim schools, Islamia School (in Brent, London) and Al-Furqan School (in 
Birmingham), into the state sector by awarding each Voluntary Aided (VA) sta- 
tus. This status prescribed an allocation of public money to cover teacher salaries 
and the running costs of the school. It arrived “fourteen years and five Secretaries 
of State after the first naive approach” (Hewitt, 1998: 22), when Muslim parents 
and educators had only begun to get to grips with the convoluted application 
process to achieve state funding, and were dealing with a Conservative adminis- 
tration hostile to the idea of state-funded Muslim schools. 
Both Islamia and Al-Furqun schools had already undergone a strict inspection 
by the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) (2004) and had more than met 
the appropriate governmental criteria required of independent schools apply- ing 
for state funding. Alongside the obvious, such as the delivery of a good stand- ard 
of education and the economic feasibility of a school, these criteria required: 
(a) the adoption and delivery of the National Curriculum, (b) the appointment of 
appropriately qualified staff, (c) the provision of suitable school buildings, 
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(d) equality of opportunity for both male and female pupils and (e) 
consideration of parental demand. All of this is of course premised upon the 
‘need’ for a school in a given area based upon the number of available pupil 
spaces. In the past, this has been cited as the principle reason for – having met all 
other criteria – refusing some Muslim schools to opt into the state system, whilst 
simultaneously inviting other religious schools in similar areas to do so (see 
AMSS, 2004: 20; Parker- Jenkins, 2002: 279). Nevertheless, the success of these 
two schools was given fur- ther impetus in the Government White Paper, 
Schools: Achieving Success (2001), so that nine years and another four Secretaries 
of State later the current number of state-funded Muslim faith schools has risen 
to include Al-Hijrah (a secondary school in Birmingham), Feversham College (a 
secondary school in Bradford), Gatton Primary School (in Wandsworth, South 
London), Tauheedul Islam Girls High School (Blackburn, Lancashire) and The 
Avenue School (another primary school in Brent, London). 
It has been argued that – given the existence of over 4,700 state-funded 
Church of England schools, over 2,100 Catholic, 33 Jewish and 28 Methodist 
schools – Muslim campaigns for Islamic faith schooling in the state sector is 
indicative of “a modern society which is widely perceived as increasingly 
secular but is paradoxically increasingly multi-faith” (Skinner, 2002: 172). Thus 
until 2010 there were predominantly two broad types of faith schools in England 
and Wales. These were privately funded independent schools and voluntary-
aided denominational schools. The School Standards and Framework Act 
introduced the concept of a ‘religious character’ in 1998 thus modifying the 
range of types of school receiving state funding (UK Parliament, 1998). Of these 
schools voluntary-aided (VA) schools are free to have denominational religious 
education. Voluntary-aided schools with a religious character are funded up to 
90 per- cent by local authorities, with outstanding costs being covered by an 
associated religious organisation (DfES, 2002: 4). A small number of state-funded 
faith schools also emerged with the ‘City Academies’ scheme introduced 
through the Learning and Skills Act 2000 and later shortened to ‘Academies’ 
with the 2002 Education Act. Within the independent sector, all schools are 
required to be registered and may be inspected at any time under the 2002 
Education Act. Faith schools within this context are independent schools which 
have registered as hav- ing a religious character under the Designation of 
Schools Having a Religious Character (Independent Schools) (England) Order 
2003. Therefore, although there may be instances of schools within the state 
sector having intakes of almost exclusively Muslim children, this characteristic in 
and of itself does not define a ‘faith’ school. Muslim ‘faith’ schools in England 
and Wales currently exist in the following forms: independent fee-paying 
schools with a distinctive religious character; voluntary-aided schools funded up 
to 90 percent by the state with a distinctive religious character and 
denominational Religious Education; academies that are state-funded in 
partnership with sponsors and/or educational trusts; and state-funded free 
schools. Although many Muslim children attend madrasahs, these are 
supplementary classes rather than schools in themselves. 
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The faith schools landscape has thus changed significantly over the last two 
decades. Prior to 1998, the 1993 Education Act provided an opportunity for 
independent religious schools to apply directly to the Department for Educa- 
tion for state funding through ‘grant-maintained’ status (DfE, 1993). Schools 
successful in the application process would be answerable to central 
government rather than to the then ‘local education authorities’. It was this 
mechanism which allowed for the first independent Muslim schools, the 
Islamia Primary in Brent and Al-Furqan in Birmingham, to enter the state 
sector as grant-maintained schools in 1998. With the abolition of ‘grant-
maintained status’ in 1999, these schools were incorporated into the 
voluntary-aided sector. Numbers of state- funded Muslim schools have grown 
slowly but steadily and between 1998 and 2010 12 voluntary-aided Islamic 
schools were established in England and Wales. New Labour’s support for the 
expansion of state-funded Muslim schools was sustained through the 2005 
white paper: Higher Standards, Better Schools for All. The white paper invited 
independent schools to enter the state sector, but a particular emphasis was 
placed on encouraging Muslim schools to apply for voluntary-aided status 
(DfES, 2010). This rhetoric was sustained in subse- quent years with 
representatives of major faith groups being encouraged to work closely with 
the government to produce Faith in the system (DCSF, 2007). The paper was 
centred around a “joint declaration and shared vision of schools with a 
religious character in twenty-first century England” (DCSF, 2007: 4). The 
paper identified that nearly 15,000 Muslim children were attending 
independent schools with a particular religious character. Thus, catering to the 
needs of these children within the state sector could provide an important 
contribution to inte- gration and the empowerment of these communities. The 
primary mechanism for Muslim schools to secure state funding for a 
denominational school with a distinctive Islamic ‘character’ up until 2010 was 
through successfully qualifying for voluntary-aided funding. The public 
policy narratives from 1998 to 2010 facilitated the watershed of establishing 
the first state-funded Muslim schools in England and Wales and their legacy is 
manifested in the 12 voluntary-aided Islamic schools currently receiving state 
funding. 
In light of the advances made in terms of the enfranchisement of Muslim 
com- munities through state funding for Islamic schools, the arrival of the 
Coalition government in 2010 was met with some anxiety over the level of 
support that faith communities would continue to receive. Specifically, the 
advent of the reces- sion, the Coalition’s commitment to ‘austerity measures’ 
raised questions about the future of financial support for the expansion of 
Muslim schools. Since the Academies Act (2010), voluntary-aided schools 
across the board have been faced with balancing the perceived benefits of 
converting to academy status against the risks of retaining their existing status 
within a competitive education mar- ket. Government statistics indicate that 
the conversion rate for voluntary-aided schools becoming academies across 
the sector had reached 33 percent by 2013 (UK Parliament, 2013: 4). In terms of 
uptake across denominations, Church of England schools appear to be taking 
the lead with 41 percent having converted 
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to academy status by 2013 compared with 25 percent of Roman Catholic schools 
(UK Parliament, 2013: 4). Whilst this is insightful, the impact of the academy 
system for Muslim schools is not yet clear. In addition to championing acad- 
emies, the Academies Act (2010) also provided the framework for Free Schools as a 
mechanism for ‘communities and faith groups’ (UK Government, 2014) to develop 
schools to cater to local needs. 
The development of Muslim schools has raised questions about the impli- 
cations of these schools for social divisiveness. For example, Rabbi Jonathan 
Romain argued that faith schools had an instrumental role in the riots in Brad- 
ford, Oldham and Leeds in the summer of 2001 (pre-9/11), with the implicit 
division across religious lines meaning that children may become “suspicious, 
fearful and hostile” (Romain, 2001: 18). However, it is important to recognise that 
the ‘schools’ within which intakes had become segregated across religious lines 
were not actually Muslim ‘faith’ schools. This kind of blurring of the lines between 
anxieties about Muslim schools and occurrences of segregation in the non-
denominational sector have most recently been manifested in media cover- age of 
the ‘trojan horse’ letter sent to Birmingham City Council in 2013. The anonymous 
letter reportedly identified that schools in Birmingham had been tar- geted ‘to be 
taken over’ with a view to running those schools according to ‘strict Islamic 
principles’ (Kershaw, 2014: 3). An investigation into ‘trojan horse’ found that a 
systematic strategy had been outlined in the letter for establishing stronger Islamic 
influence in non-denominational state schools catering for local Mus- lim 
communities (Kershaw, 2014: 6). This strategy comprised a five-step process which 
included identifying groups of Salafi parents and garnering their support, 
installing governors to ‘drip feed’ ideals for an Islamic school and bringing exist- 
ing head teachers into discredit and applying pressure until they are removed 
(Kershaw, 2014: 6). Whilst the investigation identified that there were “concerns 
which require immediate attention”, it concluded that the “evidence collated to 
date does not support a conclusion that there was a systematic plot to take over 
schools” (Kershaw, 2014: 8). It is also worth restating that any issues of concern 
which might be raised by ‘trojan horse’ are relevant to non-denominational 
schools with a majority intake of Muslim children, not denominational Islamic 
schools. 
Nevertheless, anxieties about publicly funded Muslim schools continue to dom- 
inate media narratives on faith schooling. For example, following the announce- 
ment in 2011 that the Tauheedul Islam boys school would be the first Muslim free 
school in the country, the Daily Mail immediately published an article quoting 
Simon Jones (national executive for the National Union of Teachers) stating that 
the school was “extremely bad news” for community cohesion and that there will 
be “potential social problems on the future” (Daily Mail, 2011). Time has revealed 
that the Tauheedul Islam boys school is now one of two Tauheedul free schools, 
with its sister institution, a girls secondary, fostering excellent exam results and 
topping a secondary school league table whilst also being praised for quality of 
teaching and the behaviour and prospects of its pupils (Evans, 2013). Furthermore, 
the schools are “non-selective Muslim faith-based schools who 
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welcome pupils from all faiths and none” (Tauheedul Education Trust, 2014). 
Furthermore, the schools are now part of the wider Tauheedul Education Trust, a 
growing “not for profit multi-academy trust” (TE Trust, 2015) that appears to be 
engaging in entrepreneurial activities in exactly that way that the 2010 Acad- 
emies Act has encouraged. 
The example laid out by the Tauheedaul Education Trust demonstrates argu- 
ably the most substantive example of how the new and emerging frameworks 
around faith schooling have been used effectively within Muslim communities. 
Yet, recent media narratives around Muslim schools continue to manifest anxi- 
eties about problems that might arise with Muslim free schools. This has most 
notably been the case with the media attention around the Al-Madinah free school 
in Derby following concerns being raised by OFSTED, the Education Funding 
Agency and the Department for Education. The exact nature of the concerns raised 
by the above agencies appears to be primarily focused on ‘finan- cial 
irregularities’. A number of further issues have been discussed in the media such 
as the implementation of gender-segregated classes or enforcing compulsory 
headscarves for female students, but substantive evidence remains elusive. A con- 
sistent trend in the media circus around Al-Madinah is that its shortcomings, 
whatever they may be, are principally attributed to the schools status as a Muslim 
school rather than as a free school. Within the frameworks for free schools, ‘com- 
munities and faith groups’ may very well be free to establish schools to serve local 
needs, but under the understanding that they are entirely accountable for any 
difficulties that occur. Thus whilst new and emergent frameworks are available for 
Muslim communities to utilise in terms of establishing or bringing existing Islamic 
faith schools into the state sector, it might logically follow that a relative lack of 
state-led guidance in the process may lead to some reluctance for com- munities to 
use these frameworks. 
Within the context of the recent history of state-funded Muslim schools, the 
state of mainstream Islamic schooling can be seen to be held in a rather 
delicate balance with hard-fought, slow-paced and relatively long-standing 
gains being secured through the voluntary-aided system. An important point 
to note here is that there is a continually growing demand for Muslim schools 
in the independent sector. Exact numbers of independent Muslim schools 
have been difficult to reliably establish in recent years due to two main 
reasons. Firstly, there has been a tendency for numbers to fluctuate as 
independent Muslim schools face ongoing instability in the struggle to 
economically sustain themselves (see Breen, 2009, 2014). As one head of an 
independent school in the process of applying for state funding at the time of 
Breen’s research put it: “the impossible we do every day, miracles take a little 
bit longer. . . .” This indicates that closure is an ongoing and realistic risk faced 
by a number of independent Muslim schools. Secondly, fluctuations in 
numbers can be explained by default as the number of independ- ent Muslim 
schools entering the state-maintained sector increases, albeit slowly. Thus, 
between the years 2009–13 numbers of independent Muslim schools were 
thought to number approximately 120 at any one time. More recent analysis 
appears to reveal that there may have been some expansion in the 
independent 
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sector with the current number of independent Muslim schools totalling 158 (AMS 
data as of October 2014). Whilst it might not be possible to establish the exact scale 
of expansion in recent years, it is clear that the number of Muslim schools in the 
independent sector is on the rise. 
In line with the apparent recent expansion in the independent sector, numbers 
of Muslim schools in the state-maintained sector have also increased in recent 
years. The shift in policy frameworks around faith schooling have coincided with 
an increase in the number of state Muslim schools. The number of voluntary- 
aided Muslim schools has remained at 12 since 2009. However, following the 2010 
Academies Act, there are now eight Muslim free schools and one Mus- lim 
academy. The total number of state-funded Muslim schools in England and Wales 
is currently 21, with the most substantive recent gains having actually risen out of 
the new and emergent frameworks for free schools. In the interests of clar- ity it is 
worth noting two points here. Whilst numbers of voluntary-aided schools have 
remained at 12 for a number of years, the single Muslim school operating as an 
academy was previously a voluntary-aided school. The implication of this is that 
one school has entered the state sector through voluntary-aided status. The second 
point to note is that a large number of independent Muslim schools use the term 
‘academy’ in their name, although these schools do not receive any state funding. 
This phenomena has the capacity to distort reality quite dramatically in the public 
perceptions of the extent of educational enfranchisement Muslim com- munities 
have experienced in recent years. 
Current trends indicate that the new and emergent frameworks around ‘free 
schools’ are being utilised by Muslim communities. Whilst this is a positive devel- 
opment in terms of the educational and political enfranchisement of British Mus- 
lims, this has happened against a backdrop of negative media narratives around a 
Muslim free school. It is also worth considering that the mechanism which has 
facilitated the most recent increase in state-funded Islamic schools is that which 
requires minimal state involvement. Thus, whilst increasing numbers of Muslim 
free schools may represent important economic gains for British Muslim 
communities, the extent to which these advances can be considered to represent 
partnerships with the state such as those manifested in the voluntary aided system 
is open to question. Within the frameworks for free schools, investment in terms of 
time, risk and accountability almost exclusively lie with the community found- ing 
the school. Having set out the broad policy context, we are able to move to a more 
ethnographic account of the motivations for Muslim schools in Britain. 
 
Identity articulations 
Muslim children of school age are numerically disproportionately present in the 
British education system, making up nearly 6 percent (588,000) of the school 
population from under 3 percent (1.8 million) of the national population (Hal- 
stead, 2005; see Office for National Statistics, 2005). Reflecting the particularly 
youthful demographic of British Muslims, where 33 percent fall into the 0–15- year 
age bracket and 15 percent into the 16–24-year category (MCB, 2015: 27), 
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in some LEAs (Local Education Authority), Muslim children comprise a sig- 
nificant presence within school districts and wards. This is partially the result 
of concentrated settlement patterns by first generation migrant workers and is 
sometimes intensified by ‘white flight’ to the suburbs (Simpson, 2005). 
At the same time, Muslim pupils throughout the British education system 
her- ald a diverse ethnic composition which mirrors that of the Muslim 
population as a whole. Alongside the Pakistani (38 percent) and Bangladeshi 
(14.9 percent) contingent, it includes Turkish and Turkish Cypriot, Middle-
Eastern, East-Asian, African and Caribbean groups (10.1 percent), mixed 
race/heritage (3.8 per- cent), Indian (7.3 percent) and not an insignificant 
number of white Muslims (7.8 percent) (MCB, 2015). Does this reality of ethnic 
heterogeneity rule out the prospect of an over-arching Muslim identity? 
According to Tahir Alam, former trustee of Al-Hijrah secondary school, 
director of the teacher training wing of the Al-Hijrah Trust and former chair of 
the MCB education committee, it does not so much ‘rule out’ as give emphasis 
to the differentiation amongst pupils in Muslim schools. 
It is worth noting how this imagining of a Muslim and Islamic identity in 
Muslim schooling goes hand in hand with a re-imagining of British identity, 
which is very evident in Trevathan’s characterisation of the ‘ethos’ of Islamia 
Primary, one of the oldest Muslim schools in Britain and one of the first to 
receive state funding: 
 
If anything – this school is about creating a British Muslim culture, instead 
of, as I’ve often said in the press, conserving or saving a particular culture, 
say from the subcontinent or from Egypt or from Morocco or from wher- 
ever it may be. Obviously those cultures may feed into this British Muslim 
cultural identity, but we’re not in the business of preserving . . . it’s just 
not feasible and it’s not sensible . . . it’s dead: I mean I’m not saying those 
cultures are dead but it’s a dead duck in the water as far as being here is 
concerned. 
(Trevathan, Interview) 
 
Trevathan is obviously keen to partner the Muslim dimension with the 
British, so that instead of suffocating hybridity or encouraging reification, for 
example, the outward projection of this internal diversity informs the pursuit 
of hyphenated identities. The casualty in this ‘steering’ of British Muslim 
identity is the geographical origin conception of ethnicity, witnessed in the 
scramble to de- emphasise ‘ethnic culture’ in favour of an ecumenical Islamic 
identity. This is elsewhere evident in the complaint that there are a lack of 
provisions within comprehensive schooling to cater for identity articulations 
that are not premised upon the recognition of minority status per se, but 
which move outward on their own terms in an increasingly confident or 
assertive manner, based upon the subscription to common Islamic traditions. 
Idreas Mears, director of the Association of Muslim Schools (AMS) stresses 
this position: 
 
[S]tate schools do not handle the meaning of Muslim identity well for the 
children. In actual fact, the way that general society looks at Muslims is as 
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an immigrant minority-ethnic-racial-group and how young people are made 
to look at themselves through the teaching in state schools tells them ‘you 
are this marginal group/minority group and have therefore got to integrate 
with the mainstream’. So there’s a process of marginalisation and that often 
leads to resentment. But in a Muslim school that identity is built upon being 
a Muslim not an ethnic minority. . . . I think it gives young people a greater 
sense of who they are and how they can interact in society and therefore 
learn that Islam is not just a thing that is relevant to minority rights. Islam is 
rel- evant to economy, to foreign policy, etc. which means that we’re not 
getting on to a stationary train but a train that is moving. 
(Mears, Interview 1 April 2006) 
 
This ‘train’ moves between sites of boundary maintenance in which Mears 
expresses a ‘clean’ version of Muslim identity free from ethnic and racial mark- 
ers. While this view ignores the lived reality, Mears appears to express it more as 
a hope to be realised through Muslim schooling. This desire corresponds with 
findings from Patricia Kelly’s (1999: 203) ethnographic study of schooling 
choices among Muslim parents with both secular and Islamic worldviews, which 
concluded, “as some less-religious families do opt for specifically Muslim educa- 
tion, we can consider this as an example of a decision selectively to emphasise 
this pan-ethnic [Muslim] group identity, in order to reap whatever benefits – 
eco- nomic, social and psychological as well as spiritual – it offers.” A similar 
rationale permeates the Association of Muslim Social Scientists’ (AMSS) (2004: 
11) mani- festo, Muslims on Education, in which ‘Muslim’ refers “not only [to] 
practising adherents of Islam, but also those who identify themselves ‘Muslim’ 
(without necessarily being practising) or who belong to a household or family 
that holds Islam as its descendant faith.” 
This conception of Muslim identity is expressed and consolidated in survey 
data that inevitably includes both types, behavioural and attitudinal, but reports 
that 74 percent of a representative adult Muslim sample in Britain say that reli- 
gion is ‘very important’ to them (Modood et al., 1997: 331) without necessitat- 
ing an inquiry into their degree of religiosity, let alone religious practice. It also 
emphasises that much of the motivation for Muslim schooling reflects the desire 
of some Muslim parents who embrace it as means through which to instil some 
sense of Muslim heritage in all its heterogeneity. 
It is worth noting, however, that there is no entirely coherent view amongst 
Muslim parents on faith schooling1 and, since over 97 percent of Muslim chil- 
dren are educated in state schools, most Muslim parents who pursue religious 
continuity for their children have had to do so within relatively inflexible edu- 
cational contexts. It is this realisation that has made schooling a “major area of 
struggle for equality of opportunity and assertion of identity” (Ansari, 2004: 
298), and an area where “in the face of major opposition from broad sections of . 
. . society” (ibid). Muslims have succeeded in having some basic ‘needs’ 
recognised, e.g., provision of Halal (Kosher) meals (Meer et al., 2009). This 
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has informed – and been informed by – a parallel debate about the schooling 
of ethnic minority children which has been raging since the 1960s: the role and 
content of the school curricular, and parental rights (Crowther, 1959; Newsom, 
1963; Plowden, 1967; Coard, 1971; Bagley, 1973; Rampton, 1982; Swann 
Report, 1985; Burnage Report, 1989; Basit, 1997; Cantle, 2001; Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion, 2007). For British Muslims, whether parents are 
advocates for separate schooling or not, educational empowerment means 
access to options parallel with choices available to other groups. The onus is 
then placed upon the state to accommodate Muslim communities, parents and 
children as they have other faiths. 
The validity of this rationale, that Muslim minorities who mobilise for 
Muslim faith schooling are simply seeking an expansion of the faith schooling 
sector, is rejected by prominent figures in both anti-religious and anti-racist 
camps alike. Terry Sanderson, President of the National Secular Society, for 
example, argues that 
 
. . . we’re heading towards a catastrophe unless the government change 
their policy . . . The more Christian ones they create, the more the clamour 
becomes for Muslim schools to be created and I think it’s a disaster 
because the only way that we’re going to break down barriers between 
people is to bring them together at a very early age and this government 
is going in com- pletely the opposite direction to that. 
(Interview with Terry Sanderson, 8 June 2007) 
 
In less apocalyptic but equally strident terms, Dan Lyndon, director of the 
‘black history 4 schools’ project and a member of the Black and Asian Studies 
Association (BASA), voices similar objections on the grounds of separatism 
and in-egalitarianism: 
 
I am worried about the development of faith schools because I think that 
just encourages separation . . . Personally, I would never teach in a 
religious school. Whatever religion, absolutely fundamentally, no. 
(Interview with Dan Lyndon, 13 June 2007) 
 
This is not, of course, a universal view amongst anti-racists, not least 
because some have, in the past, also endorsed the need for ‘black’ schooling. 
To this end Lee Jasper, former race equality advisor to the London mayor, 
clarifies his own position that 
 
it’s quite proper to expect the teaching staff and governors to reflect that 
local community. When majority black churches want to get together and 
do that they should be able to do so. That doesn’t extend to creating an 
apartheid regime within education but it does extend to creating the 
choice for minority communities. 
 
(Interview with Lee Jasper, 26 July 2007) 
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Perhaps the most nuanced and historically informed objection to an expansion 
of the faith sector to include Muslim schools is offered by Tony Breslin, Director 
of the Citizenship foundation: 
 
The starting point of the first generations of faith schools were much more 
monocultural societies. Faith schools, it seems to me, offer a lot in terms of 
ethos and all the rest of it. I just wonder whether non-faith schools can do 
the same thing and whether we should seek to get them to do that. . . . Part 
of the debate clearly about faith schools at the moment, is not really about 
faith schools, it’s just the specificity of Muslim schools, and I think people 
should be more honest about that. . . . I don’t think that because a particu- 
lar group was granted the right to build a faith school 50 years ago, it is a 
rationale to grant that to a different group now or another group in 50 years 
time. I think it’s about saying, where is our society at. 
(Interview with Tony Breslin, 12 June 2007) 
 
Breslin is undoubtedly correct to highlight the historical dimension of faith 
schooling against which contemporary arguments concerning parity are often 
made, as well as the centrality of Muslim mobilisations to these arguments. Yet, 
whilst it may be true to say that Muslim communities have been the most vocal 
in seeking inclusion in the faith schooling sector, it is not the case that this has 
solely been premised upon the issue of parity for other factors too have been 
salient. 
 
Muslim motivations for faith schools 
Holistic education 
The first and arguably broadest factor stems from the desire to incorporate more 
faith-based principles into an integrated education system, so that the ‘whole 
person’ can be educated in an Islamic environment (AMSS, 2004; Hewer, 2001). 
This would presuppose faith rather than treat it as something extraneous to 
education and external to its major objects (Ashraf, 1990). For example, one 
recommendation emerging from the First World Conference on Muslim 
Education stated that “education should aim at the balanced growth of the total 
personal- ity through the training of spirit, intellect, the rational self, feelings and 
bodily senses” (cited in AMSS, 2004: 12). Two approaches proposed by the 
Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS) in their position paper on 
Muslim schools include the Steiner and Montessori approaches, both of which 
encourage personal and team responsibility while “the child’s creativity is also 
given full freedom for expression” (ibid: 19). Hence the objective is to encourage 
intellectual, spiritual and moral development within an Islamic setting. Thus, at 
Islamia School, Abdullah Trevathan states that a key curriculum objective is to 
prevent sources of Islamic guidance from becoming extrinsic to educational 
development. In his view, children will only properly know, explore and 
evaluate knowledge presented 
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There are two types of views of the divinity in theological perspectives: in 
classical terms one is tashbih which is like Allah’s nearness, immersion in 
our daily life or divine interventions in daily affairs, and the other is 
tanzih: the incomparability or what they call negative theology, the 
absolute omnipo- tence, distance from the individual . . . Now I believe 
what we’re trying to do in this school is to return to a more tashbih . . . it’s 
very important that they’re [the pupils] exposed to the classical ussal al-
fiqh . . . basically the methodology of applying principles to different 
situations, rather than taking or transporting rules or regulations out of 
another time and another place . . . literally. 
 
 
(Trevathan, Interview) 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, given its pragmatic emphasis upon the present, this 
pro- ceeds through an introduction to classical Arabic, presented as a conduit 
through which this holistic immersion can take place: 
 
We teach classical Qu’ranic Arabic. We think it’s fundamental to the flow- 
ering of Muslim culture that the language of its philosophy, the language 
particularly of its spirituality is taught. And also there are key concepts 
such that if you’ve got the Arabic you immediately have access to that 
nuance, that feeling that the word evokes! 
 
 
(ibid) 
 
Islamia School is not alone in this view, for it is common to find the teaching 
of Qur’anic Arabic listed on many Muslim schools’ curricula and mission 
state- ments (IHRC, 2005). This manner of incorporating faith-based principles 
into an integrated education system, as opposed to a more straightforward 
approach of teaching genesis or religious history, for example, is also the 
preferred approach of the Association for Muslim Schools (AMS). To this end, 
Idreas Mears describes how a child’s understanding of the interpretative 
traditions within Islam is akin to wielding a powerful educational ‘tool’ that is 
simultaneously spiritual and educative: 
 
Muslims are people that bring down a meaning to an event: we’re 
creatures of meaning, and a Muslim expresses real meaning by ibadah 
because we see that the ultimate meaning is to be a worshipper of Allah 
but then bringing that down onto the axis of events changes how you act 
in the world. So I think the most important for Muslim schools is to give 
young people that as a tool in their hands that they can pick up and run 
with. 
(Mears, Interview) 
 
88 
 
It is important to stress that this view is not advanced naively by Mears. In a 
measure of increasing confidence, critical self-evaluation and institutional net- 
working, the AMS has been at the forefront of creating an interfaith ‘inspector- 
ate’ to monitor the content and standard of different faith-based schooling. This 
is informed by the recognition that whilst areas of numeracy and literacy are 
strin- gently monitored by the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED), 
religious instruction is rarely so. Mears elaborates: 
The AMS has made an application to the DfES to deliver inspection services 
for OFSTED inspections of independent Muslim schools. . . . As well as 
looking at the areas that are necessary in the OFSTED criteria . . . we will be 
looking at how the school is delivering the religious ethos, because up until 
this point we accept that Muslim schools are Muslim schools because they 
say so. There’s no real inspection of that and there can be a whole spectrum 
of people delivering nothing about Islam at all, but instead being a cultural 
protection zone for children. . . . 
 
(Mears, Interview) 
Lending some support to Jacobson’s (1997) “religion-ethnic culture distinc- 
tion”, which argues that ethnicity is increasingly peripheral amongst some 
British Muslims, Mears is at pains to stress the distinction between a school 
premised upon an ethnic origin conception of Islam, driven by a desire for 
‘cultural protection zones’ and an Islamically driven environment that moves 
outward to build upon evaluative criteria already established and in place. 
 
Separation of sexes 
The criticism that Muslim schools can serve as cultural protection zones is some- 
times made through pointing to the evidence of Muslim parents’ preferences for 
single-sex schooling. Through an interpretation of Islam which posits that “after 
puberty boys and girls should be separated” (Hashmi, 2002: 14), there is 
certainly a desire to develop ‘safe’ environments, and in this regard single-sex 
schooling undoubtedly appeals to Muslim parents (Hewer, 2001). The reten- tion 
of single-sex schools was recommended by the Swann Committee (1985) and 
their increasing non-availability may also influence Muslim parents’ interest in 
faith schooling. According to Hussain of Al-Hijrah School, a school which 
maintains separate teaching rooms, the motivation for single-sex schooling is “to 
ensure that they [pupils] are more focused on their studies . . . it is primarily 
about their learning.” Elsewhere, the Muslim Parents Association (MPA) formed 
in 1974 on this single issue, and continues to support the creation of a number of 
independent single-sex Muslim schools. In addition to Al-Hijrah, the creation of 
Feversham College in Bradford was to some extent modelled on Catholic faith 
schooling (Halstead, 1988) by employing separate teaching rooms (Haw, 1998). It 
is important to note, however, that this is not a policy desired for primary 
schooling and is contradicted by some existing co-educational Muslim schools 
that employ mixed teaching classes. 
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Specialist training 
A third factor informing the Muslim interest in faith schooling is the current 
lack of specialist training in Islamic religious sciences, the provision of which 
might allow young people to “be educated to serve their communities as 
potential reli- gious leaders” (Hewer, 2001: 518). This includes the desire to 
have more British trained theologians capable of discussing theological issues 
with a contemporary resonance to the lived experiences of being Muslim in 
Britain. The immediacy of this requirement is illustrated with the example of 
unsuitable religious instruc- tors, including non-British imams that are 
unfamiliar with the particular contexts and experiential lives of Muslims in 
Britain. Trevathan elaborates: 
 
[T]here’s a vacuum here because the mosques just aren’t set up to deal 
with the problems of modern people. If you import an imam from Egypt 
or from Pakistan and somebody comes to them with a problem which is 
within a modern European context, it would often be things that the 
imams would have never encountered in their lives and so have no means 
– or the wrong means – of dealing with it. 
 
(Interview) 
 
The dynamics informing the balance that schools must achieve in off-setting 
the desire for ‘home-grown’ religious instructors, with broader and more 
wide- ranging programmes of education, are traced out by Alam: 
 
There are schools that do actually give more curriculum time to more 
tradi- tional sciences, you call it theology but I would call it traditional 
sciences to do with Sunnah and Hadith and those sorts of subjects . . . but 
they also do English, maths and science . . . they just don’t allocate as 
much time to these subjects as they would if the school was funded by the 
state. So there you have the flexibility as an independent institution so, 
currently, all those that are state-funded couldn’t have the luxury of being 
able to do that. I think schools would say that yes they would like more 
time but there’s not enough time to deliver the national curriculum, which 
is a requirement, as well as devoting adequate time to really focus 
properly on some of the traditional sciences and subjects as well. So 
there’s a trade-off, I suppose, and a debate about the balance in each 
school. 
(Alam, Interview) 
 
Muslim educationalists thus point to an inevitable limitation in the scope to 
incorporate, into the state sector, schools that do deliver a greater proportion 
of theological education and training: 
 
If a school wants to retain an emphasis on teaching traditional sciences, 
and for them that’s important perhaps, then they may well be reluctant to 
receive funding because they then have to teach the national curriculum and 
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compromises have to be made on other things such as teaching the Qu’ran 
and Islamic history to a level they would like and so on. So some of those 
institutions that specialise in these areas are not going to come into the state 
sector, because if they did they’d have to drop everything else and change 
the nature of their institution to a very large degree and that’s not what 
they’re about. 
(ibid) 
The enthusiasm for, or hesitation at, becoming co-opted into the state sector 
should not therefore simply be assumed, but taken on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Ethnocentric curricula on Islam 
Fourthly, in order to impart more accurate knowledge of Islamic civilisations, 
literature, languages and arts, there is a desire to see broader aspects of Islamic 
culture embedded within the teaching and ethos of school curricula. In their 
study, Douglass and Shaikh (2004) found that throughout commonly used text- 
books, Islam is rarely portrayed in the ways its adherents understand but more 
through the ethnocentric perspectives of editors who frame their commentary 
for textbook adoption committee audiences. Common examples of the sorts of 
inaccuracies include the portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad as the ‘inventor’ of 
Islam, rather than a messenger or prophet, as well as an artificial separation of 
Islam from other monotheistic faiths. This has led Ameli, Azami and Merali 
(2005: 26) to argue that “it is difficult to escape the conclusion that textbooks 
deliberately downplay or exclude connections between Islam and Abraham in 
order to maintain neat partitions among the symbols, beliefs and major figures.” 
This complaint feeds into the broader charge that Local Education Authorities 
(LEAs) have only “tinkered with the largely ethnocentric curricula, leaving Mus- 
lim children feeling alienated and with damaged self-esteem” (Ansari, 2002: 22). 
 
Low educational attainment 
Finally, there is concern over the lower educational attainment of some Muslim 
children, Bangladeshi and Pakistani boys in particular, and the belief that 
increased accommodation of religious and cultural difference will help address 
this and pre- vent further marginalisation from taking place. According to Office 
for National Statistics (2004) data, nearly 50 percent of men and women of 
Bangladeshi ethnic origin and 27 percent of men and 40 percent of women of 
Pakistani ethnic origin hold no academic qualifications (see also Haque (2002)). 
Educational outcomes amongst young Muslims in relation to this general ethnic 
breakdown are simi- larly concerning. Only 30 percent of young males with 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic origin, according to some sources, achieved 
five GCSEs2 at grades A*–C, compared with 50 percent of the national 
population as a whole.3 
According to Halstead (2005: 136), these figures indicate a “sense of alienation 
and disaffection felt by many young male Muslims at school,” an assertion given 
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empirical support in a study undertaken by the IQRA Educational Trust (see 
Pye, Lee and Bhabra (2000), and which was also raised by the Commission on 
the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB) (2000: 152) in its recommendation 
that government implement targets to decrease the number of school 
exclusions currently experienced by some Muslim groups. While it is accepted 
that parental education and social class play an important role in shaping 
these educational outcomes, Halstead (2005: 137) lists a host of other issues 
that are perceived to be relevant by Muslims themselves: “religious discrimination; 
Islamophobia; the lack of Muslim role models in schools; low expectations on 
the part of teachers; time spent in mosque schools; the lack of recognition of 
the British Muslim identity of the student” (see also Coles, 2008). According to 
Alam, Muslim schools sensitive to these experiences can help elevate 
educational outcomes 
On the whole the Muslim schools are performing pretty well; they’re 
better than their like for like in state sector . . . In terms of the focus they 
provide for their children, and the dedication, and quite often many of the 
teachers in these schools are not even qualified teachers, yet their students 
get better results than people who are qualified! You do get examples 
where Muslim schools in the independent sector perform badly, but 
they’re resource issues really, to do with under-funding and not really 
anything else . . . shoestring budgets and you can’t really do anything on 
those. Barring those sorts of schools, and there are a few around, the vast 
majority of schools in fact – if you take into account the student budgets 
that they operate on – what they do is in fact quite remarkable. 
(Alam, Interview) 
 
The academic achievements of Muslim schools Alam is pointing to include 
the examples of 100 percent of GCSE entrants from Al-Furqan Community 
College (Birmingham), Leicester Islamic Academy, Madani School (Tower 
Hamlets), Tayyibah School (Hackney) and Brondesbury College (Brent) 
achieving five or more passes at grades A*–C, along with Feversham College 
(Bradford) achieving 53 percent of such passes, higher than the national 
average (and well above the Bradford average). 
 
The form and structure of Muslim schools 
Where Muslim parents have opted out of the state sector, these desires have 
resulted in the creation of over 100 independent schools with a Muslim ethos, 
educating over 14,000 pupils from ethnically diverse communities in predomi- 
nantly inner city areas. These institutions deliver both ‘secular’ and Islamic 
edu- cation, and are best described as Muslim schools with “the goal of living 
up to the standards of Islam, rather than implying its achievement” (Douglass 
and Shaikh, 2004: 8). Typically established in homes, mosques and similar 
build- ings by groups of concerned parents and community activists (Hewer, 
2001: 518), the vast majority are low-fee schools in poorer quality buildings 
which, 
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unsurprisingly, lack many of the facilities common to state schools (Walford, 
2003). The main reason for this is financial insecurity. Since they rely upon com- 
munity support and are seldom purpose-built, they may open and close depend- 
ing upon the resources and stability afforded by the local Muslim communities 
themselves. Thus every school is, according to Trevathan, “a microcosm of the 
society around it,” which means that despite being private institutions, they are 
better thought of as ‘community-based schools’ since they rarely operate com- 
mercially. A fascinating illustration of these schools’ community focus can be 
found in the example of pastoral advice to pupils’ parents, as Trevathan 
describes: 
One of the things we’ve realised frequently is that first of all we’re not just a 
school – we’re much more. In many ways, we’re educating parents as much 
as we’re educating children and frequently we get a request for an 
appointment to see me and they’ll insist that it’s something personal, and 
then they’ll come in and they won’t be parents or prospective parent, but a 
married couple having relationship problems. So myself and Sheikh Ahmed, 
who is the imam here, would – if we could – give some marriage 
counselling. And we will do that if the parents are of our children because 
it’s part of our responsibility to the children as educators. 
 
(Interview with Meer) 
 
All independent schools are now required to register with the Department of 
Education and Skills under The Education (Independent School Standards) (England) 
Regulations (2003). Failure to do so invites the prospect of closure and since the 
criteria are not dissimilar from the conditions that must be met before a 
Voluntary Aided (VA) status can be achieved, it was feared that these guidelines 
would have a disproportionate affect on Muslim schools. It is therefore 
surprising that these guidelines were viewed by the AMS as a process necessary 
to raising the basic standards of all would-be Muslim schools. This is evident in 
Mears’ account: 
 
There always was a history of starting up and then not managing to con- 
tinue. . . . Now if they get through the registration process they’re prone to 
grow very quickly. At this point I actually welcome anything that makes 
Muslim schools more rigorous in their own standards and it doesn’t just 
have to be about the registration and inspection process which looks at the 
gen- eral criteria of education. Now, where they do come into existence, 
they’re stronger schools than they would otherwise have been. 
(Interview) 
 
Of course the incentive for official registration is the accompanying profes- 
sional inspection and advice, with the long-term aim of becoming co-opted into 
the state sector under the status of VA school. This process has often been co- 
ordinated by organisations such as the AMS and the Islamic Schools Trust (IST), 
which facilitate many schools’ dialogue with LEAs and central government. So 
these are some of the issues involved in the processes but what the discussion thus 
93 
 
far has not addressed, however, is how Muslim educators respond to some of 
the key arguments against Muslim schools. These range from a principled 
philosophi- cal opposition to all faith schooling through to more focused 
arguments concern- ing the nature of Muslim schools in particular. 
 
The argument for autonomies 
One of the most commonly held views of education is that it should cultivate the 
development of rational and moral autonomy. This position opposes all forms of 
faith schooling and strenuously argues that all autonomy-supporting socie- ties 
must guard children from “believers who wish to impose on them a non- 
autonomous conception of the good life” (White, 1990: 105). This is a central 
argument contained within the Humanist Philosophers’ Group’s (HPG) (2001: 
10) influential report, Religious Schools: The Case Against. This begins by charg- 
ing faith schooling with ‘indoctrination’, characterised as limiting the 
autonomy of a child by implanting beliefs that neither empirical evidence nor 
rational argu- ment might change. 
The implication of this perspective is that young people in religious schools are 
denied the opportunity to develop the competencies in making informed choices, 
specifically because such schools are predisposed to indoctrinate and proselytise. 
There are two very interesting and equally challenging responses to this argu- 
ment. The first begins by rejecting the a priori assumption that faith schools are 
necessarily out to indoctrinate and proselytise. For example, Muslim educators 
view their schools as a place of holistic education, and argue that “if the teacher 
speaks about something and says that within this understanding there are other 
views which he or she or ‘the Muslims’ may not agree with for such and such a 
reason – then you’re presenting the child with a fuller picture” (Trevathan, 
Interview). 
This might potentially be viewed as an example of what Terrence McLaugh- lin 
(1992: 123), the late education philosopher, described as one of a multiple launch 
pads for autonomy, in which “a legitimate starting point is from the basis of 
experience of a particular ‘world view’ or cultural identity; a substantiality of 
belief, practice or value, as in (say) a certain sort of religious school.” This offers a 
more contextual comprehension of how a child’s autonomy may be developed and 
is more comfortable with competing conceptions of education amongst dif- ferent 
cultural constituencies within a multicultural context that is not hostile to the 
wishes of religious peoples (Modood, 2007; Spinner-Halev, 2000). In this way, it is 
plausible that faith schools could adopt an educational approach that is relatively 
neutral – such as those favoured by the AMS and mentioned earlier. Thus, and 
because children have to accept many things on trust in order eventually to 
progress to autonomy (and possibly reject those things later), religion could be 
treated no differently. The HPG rightly questions, however, whether 
indoctrination can ever be avoided, given the difficulty of teaching religion in such 
a way that children can grasp and appreciate it in any depth without necessarily 
accepting beliefs which are difficult, if not impossible, to revise or reject 
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when one has reached an adult age. This is an important criticism which leads to 
a related debate about the nature of religious knowledge and the conditions 
under which it can be acquired. 
Of course the Muslim perspective eschews the idea of reason being tainted by 
‘The Fall’ since in Islam humanity is brought into the world in a state of inno- 
cence (fitra) much like a blank sheet (tabula rasa). This means, “the concept of 
‘original sin’ as presented in Christian theology is non-existent in the newborn 
child” (Hussain, 2004: 319). What we should take from Ahdar and Leigh (2005) is 
the implication that unless a child acquires this knowledge at a sufficient depth of 
understanding, they will not be able to exercise valid consent anyway, so that from 
their perspective the goal of autonomy is already thwarted. Accordingly, the 
curriculum and environment of the religious school may be essential to the 
achievement of a level of understanding that makes informed consent (and thus 
autonomy) possible. 
The second potential response to the HPG’s charge of indoctrination has two 
parts to it but begins by making a relational argument which contests the assump- 
tion that secular schools can avoid indoctrination by being a-religious. For 
example, Arnsone and Shapiro (1996) point to a sleight of hand in non-religious 
contexts where certain possibilities or options are only made available to adults 
because they have prioritised them to the exclusion of many others in childhood, 
e.g., develop- ing skills in certain arts or sports. As Ahdar and Leigh (2005: 228) 
argue, “The rigorous keeping of a child’s future to maximise adult opportunities 
would, in effect, deprive the child of the possibility of becoming a professional 
ballerina or footballer. Could it not be argued that the same applies to religious 
upbringing?” 
A much stronger objection is made by Grace (2002: 14), however, who laments 
the degree of bad faith central to the charge of indoctrination against religious 
faith schools. This is because secular schools are not themselves ideologically 
free zones, and carry “their own ideological assumptions about the human 
person, the ideal society” which “characteristically permeate the ethos and 
culture of state-provided secular schools and form a crucial part of the ‘hidden 
curricu- lum’.” The view that there is a bias permeating secularist charges 
against faith- based schooling is shared by some Muslim educators. Although 
this often begins by pointing to the inconsistency described by Grace (2002), if 
we follow Treva- than and Mears’s response to this charge, we find a more 
qualified and nuanced insight than that premised upon the equivalence 
argument alone: 
 
I’m not arguing that indoctrination doesn’t take place here; it’s just that it 
also takes place everywhere else. Secular society continues to see itself out- 
side of dogma and doctrine – but that’s ridiculous because it uses both to 
indoctrinate a system of beliefs and values. Now, there is reprehensible indoc- 
trination and I think that is when the child is not made free to make deci- 
sions concerning their own thinking. In the classroom, that would translate 
into the teacher telling them that such and such is the case and any other 
argument is false. 
 
(Trevathan, Interview) 
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All schools are indoctrinating processes . . . I think there are stages of 
educa- tion that ought to make your understanding of that process more 
acute, and I don’t think that enough emphasis is given in education to the 
play aspect, for too many formal learning processes are coming in too 
early. 
(Mears, Interview) 
 
This then rehearses the objection to viewing non-religious schooling as a 
neutral enterprise, and simultaneously invites the different and equally broad 
objection to modes of political integration that try to separate public and 
private spheres in some liberal-civic convention (cf Guttman, 1994). The 
distinction is elaborated after a consideration of the relationship between these 
conceptions of autonomy and conceptions of ‘good citizenship’. 
 
Good citizens 
There is a genuine and problematic tension between espousing an HPG type 
of radical autonomy argument against religious education whilst, 
simultaneously, holding the reasonable view that the education process 
should contribute to the cultivation of future ‘good citizens’. This is 
epitomised by states’ interest in ascribing and inculcating liberal or civic 
virtues, a point famously set out in Rawls’s (1993: 199) formulation: 
 
. . . political liberalism . . . will ask that children’s education will include 
such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that, 
for example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society 
and that apostasy is not a legal crime . . . Moreover, their education 
should also prepare them to be fully cooperating members of society and 
enable them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political 
virtues so that they want to honour the fair terms of social cooperation in 
their relations with the rest of society. 
 
This sort of thinking has permeated the drive in Britain for citizenship 
educa- tion (Qualifications Curriculum Authority, 1998), which entails a clear 
desire to engender a particular ‘civic morality’ amongst young people through 
imparting knowledge of political functions and historic practices, as one of the 
opening paragraphs of the report chaired by Sir Bernard Crick makes clear: 
 
We aim at no less than a change in the political culture of this country 
both nationally and locally: for people to think of themselves as active 
citizens, willing, able and equipped to have an influence in public life and 
with the critical capacities to weigh evidence before speaking and acting; 
to build on and extend radically to young people the best in existing 
traditions of com- munity involvement and public service, and to make 
them individually con- fident in finding new forms of involvement and 
action among themselves. 
(Qualifications Curriculum Authority, 1998: paragraph 1.5) 
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This begs the question, however, as to when the impetus behind want- ing to 
form ‘good’ or ‘active’ citizens will actually conflict with the growing autonomy 
of the child. To put it another way: “at what point should he or she be free to 
reject liberalism and make mature, illiberal, choices of his or her own?” (Ahdar 
and Leigh, 2005: 231). The implication being that to make the objection to faith 
schools on the basis that they might curtail the child’s autonomy can be 
inconsistent, given that the inculcation of any sort of civic morality can be subject 
to the same charge. This is an argument elaborated in Meer et al. (2009), but 
another way of stating it here would be to insist that education for citizenship 
must necessarily proceed with attention to the social, through the reciprocal 
balance of rights and responsibilities that confer upon its recipients a civic status 
that affords those pupils equal opportunity, dignity and confidence. 
 
The civic inclusion of Muslim constituencies 
This embedded reading of autonomy can be interpreted as a critique of liberal 
perfectionist thinking that is often too abstracted from the lived relations and 
real- world contexts in which Muslim schools seek to operate. It is an argument 
made by Parekh (2000: 202–3) when he contests the civic assimilationist 
approach, based upon a neat separation of public and private spheres, on the 
grounds that such a view fails to take account of institutions that encompass 
both: 
 
The school educates future citizens, and has a political dimension. How- 
ever, since children are not just citizens but also human beings and members 
of the relevant cultural communities, their parents and cultural community 
have a vital interest in their education, which makes the school a cultural 
institution that belongs to private or civic realm. If we stressed the former, 
we would have to treat the school as a public institution subject to the con- 
trol of the state and ignore parental choices and cultures; if the latter, we 
would reach the opposite conclusion. 
 
Sympathy for this view would allow for the recognition of other, intersecting 
issues affecting the articulation of Muslim identities in Britain (Roy, 2004). The 
shape and impact of these issues are subject to debate, but amongst Muslims in 
Britain it is evident that there is an attempt to reconfigure what being a Muslim 
in the West means, and that part of this process is linked to the issue of school- 
ing. As Johnson and Castelli (2002: 33) have argued: “Islam in the West is itself 
undergoing a change. As part of this change, Muslim schools are engaged in 
creating an identity for the school, the students and the larger communities asso- 
ciated with them.” Many aspects of this argument are expressed both as a hope 
and objective amongst Muslim educators. This has already been elaborated in 
Abdulla Trevanthan’s view that – if anything – Islamia School is about creating 
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a British Muslim culture, and which fits nicely with Mears’s description of the 
same phenomena: 
 
I think that what is interesting is that a kind of British Muslim Identity is 
only just emerging. I think that’s basically because the schools and 
communities were controlled by a framework led by the elder generation 
and that people still saw themselves as an immigrant minority coming 
together to protect their culture, and in a sense still relate to another place 
being home. 
 
This argument returns us to the third issue motivating the desire for Muslim 
faith schooling. This is linked to the aspiration for more British trained theolo- 
gians who could discuss theological issues with a contemporary resonance to 
the lived experiences of being a British Muslim. It is argued that such 
developments – if publicly endorsed – herald opportunities through which 
Muslim children would be able to confidently negotiate and reconcile the 
requirements of their faith with their rights and responsibilities as British 
citizens. This is substantiated in the words of Alam: 
 
You have to remember that the Muslim community is a very recent 
commu- nity in this country, we’re a very young community, but I think 
the participa- tion levels within the last five years . . . and the vibrancy of 
participation has been very encouraging . . . There’s a lot of work to be 
done of course, and this is a challenging situation that we find ourselves 
in. That we are under higher scrutiny than other communities, and how 
we respond to that and change wider society’s perceptions perhaps will 
be essential to how the Mus- lim community develops. 
(Alam, Interview) 
 
These relationships are, therefore, almost dialectical – an assessment made 
else- where by Hussain (2004: 322), who concludes that “Muslim schools are 
needed so that Muslim youth will be able to comprehend and contextualise 
Islam in their environment” (emphasis added). 
 
Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has explored how Muslim identities can inform the 
movement for Muslim schools, and specifically the various reasons that some 
Muslim minorities are seeking an incorporation and reflection of this Muslim 
identity within the arena of education. Where Muslim constituencies are granted 
greater participatory space in the shape of provisions for Muslim schooling, it is 
evident from the testimonies of Muslim educators that a synthesis between faith 
requirements and citizenship commitments is a first order priority.  It is also 
evident that this movement is seeking out a negotiated, and reciprocal, British 
Muslim identity. As such the mobilisation for Muslim schools marks an important 
shift  
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in the movement for a self-constructed identity.  An engagement with a range 
of established educational conventions, norms, regulations and precedents, 
suggests that Muslims in Britain are demonstrating a willingness and ability to 
contribute to the educational landscape something that is both novel and beneficial 
to society as a whole. 
 
Notes 
1. While there is no national survey of Muslim parents’ desires on this issue, the Fourth 
National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (1997 ) found that the ethnic composition of a 
school was more important for white respondents than it was for ethnic minorities, 
whilst preference for religious composition interestingly ranged from Catholics, who 
were the most inclined to desire faith-based schools, to Hindus, who were the least 
inclined for faith-based schooling, with Muslims and Protestants falling somewhere in 
the middle (see Modood et al., 1997 : 323). 
2.  The General Certifi cate of Secondary Education (GCSE) is the standard qualifi cation 
for students enrolled in compulsory schooling until the age of 16 years. 
3.  For a much fuller statistical summary, see Halstead’s (2005) excellent discussion from 
which I draw. 
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